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Supreme Court Clarifies Ability of

Farmers to Sue Pesticide Manufacturers

-by Roger A. McEowen*

Overview

There are several situations that a farmer may face that will limit the farmer’s ability to 
sue a manufacturer on a product liability claim.1 One of these involves damages arising 
from the use of registered pesticides. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act,2 limits the ability of injured parties to sue pesticide manufacturers on either an 
inadequate labeling or wrongful death claim basis. A significant question has been whether 
state law damage claims for pesticide-related agricultural crop injury are pre-empted by 
FIFRA and whether FIFRA pre-emption of damage claims is limited to the specific subjects 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reviews at the time it first approves a 
pesticide product’s labeling.  The recent opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bates, et al. 
v. Dow Agrosciences LLC3 provides important guidance on how courts are to analyze 
FIFRA preemption claims in the future. 
FIFRA 
FIFRA takes a preventative approach with respect to air, water and land pollution.  The 
Act is administered by the EPA and requires registration of all pesticides intended to prevent, 
destroy, repel or mitigate certain pests.4 FIFRA also regulates pesticide use and requires 
certification of pesticide applicators. The EPA must assess the risks of using a pesticide at 
the time of registration and the submission of scientific data to aid in that decision. Pesticide 
registrants must disclose expert opinions on the adverse effects of pesticides to the EPA, 
along with other “factual information” so that EPA can reach a proper determination 
concerning potential registration.5 A “general use” pesticide is one that the EPA determines 
will not cause “unreasonable adverse effects” on the environment when used as directed 
or in accordance with commonly recognized practices. “Restricted use” pesticides are 
those determined to have the potential to cause adverse environmental effects.6 
Under FIFRA, a pesticide manufacturer must obtain permission to market a pesticide by 
submitting a proposed label and supporting data to the EPA, which will register the pesticide 
if it will not cause unreasonable adverse effects to humans or the environment, and its 
label complies with FIFRA’s misbranding provision.7 A pesticide is “misbranded” if its 
label, for example, contains a statement that is false or misleading8 or lacks adequate 
instructions or warnings.9 
A state may regulate the sale and use of federally registered pesticides to the extent the 
regulation does not permit any sales or uses prohibited by FIFRA,10 but a state cannot 
impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or 
different from what FIFRA requires.11 A significant legal question concerns the 
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extent to which FIFRA preempts state common law tort claims 
on the basis that the claims impose labeling or packaging re­
quirements in addition to or different from those imposed by 
FIFRA. A majority of courts has held that FIFRA preempts all 
common law tort claims that challenge the adequacy of pesti­
cide labels.12 However, while most courts have held that FIFRA 
preempts state law claims for failure to warn, actual defective 
label claims, and claims for breach of express and implied war­
ranties, the courts have recognized that FIFRA does not neces­
sarily preempt all state law claims.13 
Overall, the courts have utilized different rationales for 
determining the extent of preemption of state common law and 
statutory claims. 
The Bates14 Case 
The plaintiffs in Bates15 were 29 Texas peanut farmers who 
claimed that in the 2000 growing season their crops were 
severely damaged by the application of the defendant’s 
pesticide. The farmers claimed that the defendant knew or 
should have known that the pesticide would stunt the growth 
of peanuts in acidic soils.16 However, the pesticide label stated 
that the pesticide was recommended in all areas where peanuts 
were grown. Before the 2001 growing season the defendant 
reregistered the pesticide with the EPA, and the EPA approved 
a supplemental label that specified that the product was not to 
be used on peanuts grown in soils with a high acidity level (pH 
of 7.2 or greater). After negotiations failed, the farmers gave 
notice of intent to sue under Texas law, and the defendant filed 
a motion for declaratory judgment in Federal District Court on 
the grounds that FIFRA preempted the farmers’ claims.  The 
farmers also brought tort claims based in strict liability and 
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty and violation of the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.17 The 
District Court granted the defendant’s motion,18 finding that 
FIFRA preempted the farmers’ claims, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.19 The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that the farmers’ claims were preempted on the basis 
that if the claims were successful, the defendant would be 
induced (as opposed to being actually required) to change its 
label.20 Accordingly, the farmers’ successful claim would 
impose an additional “requirement” on the defendant under state 
law – something the states cannot do under FIFRA. 
The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Bates21 by noting 
that FIFRA preemption applies to state rules that (1) establish a 
requirement for labeling or packaging that; (2) is in addition to 
or different from what FIFRA requires.22 The Court noted, 
therefore, that rules that require manufacturers to design 
reasonably safe products, use due care in conducting appropriate 
testing of their products, market products free of manufacturing 
defect, and to honor their express warranties or other contractual 
commitments are not preempted because they do not qualify as 
requirements for labeling or packaging. Thus, the Court ruled 
that the farmers’ claims for defective design, defective 
manufacture, negligent testing and breach of express warranty 
were not preempted.23 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
“inducement” test as overbroad – that the farmers’ claims were 
preempted because, if successful, the defendant would be 
induced to change the pesticide label. However, the Court ruled 
that the farmers’ fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims 
were premised on common law rules that qualified as 
“requirements” for labeling or packaging. But, such claims 
are only preempted, the Court reasoned, if the state level 
common law rules establish requirements that are “in addition 
to or different from” FIFRA’s standards.  The farmers claimed 
that their claims based on fraud and failure-to-warn were not 
preempted because these common law duties were equivalent 
to FIFRA’s requirements that a pesticide label not contain “false 
or misleading” statements,24 or inadequate instructions or 
warnings.25 
Ultimately, the Court ruled that it had not received sufficient 
briefing on whether FIFRA preempted the farmers’ fraud and 
failure-to-warn claims brought under Texas law, and remanded 
the case to the Fifth Circuit for a resolution of those claims. In 
remanding on these claims, the Court emphasized that a state 
law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent to a 
requirement under FIFRA to survive preemption. If, for 
example, the element of falsity contained in a Texas common 
law fraud action imposes a broader obligation than FIFRA’s 
requirement that labels not contain “false or misleading 
statements,” the action would be preempted to the extent of 
the difference.  The Court also opined that state law 
requirements must be measured against any relevant EPA 
regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards. 
Likewise, the Court stated that jury instructions must ensure 
that nominally equivalent labeling requirements are genuinely 
equivalent such that a pesticide manufacturer should not be 
held liable under a state labeling requirement unless the 
manufacturer is also liable for misbranding under FIFRA. 
Implications of the Bates26 Opinion 
In rejecting the “inducement” test of the Fifth Circuit and 
utilizing a “parallel requirements” test for determining FIFRA 
preemption, it is likely that more claims against pesticide 
manufacturers will survive preemption. It is no longer a valid 
ground for preemption that a state-based claim, if successful, 
would induce a manufacturer to change a label. Under the 
“parallel requirements” test, preemption applies only to claims 
that, if successful, would actually require a label to be changed. 
Thus, the key is whether applicable state law imposes broader 
obligations on pesticide manufacturers than does FIFRA. 
It is reasonable to believe that the Court’s opinion will likely 
lead to additional litigation against pesticide manufacturers, 
and may cause some state legislatures to reexamine state 
statutes governing pesticides with an eye toward conformity 
with FIFRA. In any event, the Court illustrated its preference 
against preemption without clear direction from the Congress.27 
That point could have implications beyond federal pesticide 
litigation, and could have an influence on state regulation of 
agricultural practices that preempt county regulation of the 
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same activities – most likely with respect to animal confinement 
operations28 and biotech crops.29 
FOOTNOTES 
1
 For a discussion of these situations, see McEowen and Harl, 
Principles of Agricultural Law, §11.05[3][d], Agricultural Law 
Press (2005). 
2
 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. 
3 125 S. Ct. 1788, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3706 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2005). 
The case is also available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/ 
03-388.ZS.html 
4
 If a pesticide registration is denied, the applicant must be 
notified of the denial and given the reason and factual basis for 
the denial. The applicant must also be given 30 days to correct 
the application, and the notice of the denial and the reasons for the 
denial must be published in the Federal Register.  A registration 
denial constitutes a final order of the EPA and is subject to judicial 
review, as well as a public hearing and scientific review of the 
EPA’s order.  7 U.S.C. § 136(d). 
5 See, e.g., American Crop Protection Association v. United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 182 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. 
D.C. 2002). 
6
 Restricted use pesticides may be applied only by individuals 
who are approved by the EPA as certified applicators.  7 U.S.C. § 
136(e)(1). 
7
 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B). 
8
 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(A). 
9
 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(F), (G). 
10
 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). 
11
 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 
12 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. 
Mich. 1987); Dillon v. Zeneca Corp., 42 P.3d 598 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 
2002) (breach of express warranty claim preempted by FIFRA 
because representations matched language on label; strict liability 
claim likewise preempted); Akee v. Dow Chemical Company, 272 
F. Supp. 2d 1112 (D. Haw. 2003) (negligence, failure to warn, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death claims 
arising out of nematocide and pesticide application to pineapple 
crop preempted by FIFRA). 
13 See, e.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Lowe v. Sporicidin, 47 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 1995)(no 
preemption of claims based on representations that “substantially 
differ” from product label) ; Kawamata Farms v. United Agri 
Products, 86 Hawaii 214, 948 P.2d 1055 (1997); Netland v. Hess 
& Clark, 284 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2002) (no preemption of claims 
for defective manufacture or design); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical 
Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, 
Inc., 933 P.2d 366 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2000), rev’g, 65 Cal. App. 4th 
467 (1998) (compliance with FIFRA’s labeling requirement does 
not bar damage suit under state law stemming from a failure to 
warn the purchaser of specific dangers). 
14 Bates, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 2005 
U.S. LEXIS 3706 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2005). 
15 Id. 
16
  Each of the plaintiffs’ farms have soils with pH levels of 7.2 
or higher. 
17 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §17.01 et seq. (West 2002). 
18
  205 F. Supp. 2d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
19
  332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003). 
20 The “inducement” test was also utilized in Hardin v. BASF 
Corp., 397 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2005)(state law claims against 
pesticide manufacturer preempted because “a favorable outcome 
for…[the farmers] would induce, if not require, BASF to alter its 
label”). 
21
 Bates, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 2005 
U.S. LEXIS 3706 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2005). 
22
 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 
23 While the Court noted that the defendant’s express warranty 
was located on the pesticide label, the Court reasoned that 
preemption did not apply because the essence of the claim was to 
make the defendant uphold the contractual commitment stated in 
the warranty.  However, to the extent the farmers’ warranty (and 
fraud) claims were based on oral representations made by the 
defendant’s agents they would be preempted. 
24
 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(A). 
25
 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(F). 
26
 Bates, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 2005 
U.S. LEXIS 3706 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2005). 
27 The Court stated, in dicta, “The long history of tort litigation 
against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the 
presumption against preemption, for Congress surely would have 
expressed its intention more clearly if it had meant to deprive injured 
parties of a long available form of compensation.” 
28 See, e.g., David, et al. v. Board of Commissioners of Norton 
County, 277 Kan. 753, 89 P.3d 893 (2004)(county regulation of 
livestock confinement facilities preempted by state law); Worth 
County Friends of Agriculture, et al. v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 
257 (Iowa 2004). 
29 See, e.g., Iowa H.F. 642, amending Iowa Code Ch. 199 
(preempting local governments from adopting or enforcing 
legislation which relates to the production, use, advertising, sale, 
distribution, storage, transportation, formulation, packaging, 
labeling, certification, or registration of agricultural seed). Signed 
into law on April 6, 2005. 
